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Abstract 
Nuclear weapons remain the unquestioned core of the defence postures of France and the United Kingdom. At the 
same time, the European Union is progressively enhancing its common foreign and security posture, notably 
through the establishment of a European Security and Defence Policy. Yet, despite evident progress in the CFSP, 
whose ultimate purpose is to lead to a “common defence policy”, EU member states still deal with nuclear issues 
on a strictly national basis. Our paper seeks to contrast the progress of EU-integration with the continuance of 
national nuclear deterrence in Europe by analysing how this is presented in European public discourse. How is 
the raison d’être of the French and British nuclear deterrents conceptualised, and how is nuclear proliferation by 
the so-called "rogue states" portrayed? The paper inquires about the construction of the rationale of the French 
and British nuclear forces and in particular their compatibility with the emerging European defence policy. What 
is the alleged purpose of European nuclear forces in European defence? Could and should a “European nuclear 
deterrent” be envisaged as the final stage in the ongoing framing of a European defence? 
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Introduction1 
Nuclear non-proliferation has developed into a key issue on the foreign policy agenda of the European 
Union (EU). This heightened attention marks a sharp contrast to Cold War times, when Western Europe 
tackled nuclear issues largely within in the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. The emergence of the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in the early 1990s laid the groundwork for the initiation 
of joint European non-proliferation efforts outside the Atlantic framework, which culminated in the 
adoption of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) in 2003. 
With the talks conducted by the three major EU powers – France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
(UK) – with Iran over uranium enrichment, non-proliferation has acquired further prominence as a 
CFSP objective. The EU’s commitment to stemming proliferation is also reflected in the inclusion of non-
proliferation clauses in all new agreements concluded with third countries since December 2003, which 
obliges both parties to abide by their obligations under arms control and disarmament treaties.  
This is part of an ongoing expansion of the EU’s security agenda, which remains unhindered by the 
impasse of the Constitutional Treaty: it has deployed military operations under the European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP), and released a European Security Strategy (ESS). Yet, notwithstanding the 
increasing salience of WMD proliferation in international politics and the progress in the CFSP, one 
question remains ignored: The creation of EU non-proliferation policies has excluded the question of 
the European - that is French and British - nuclear arsenals. So far, little attention has been paid to how 
the possession of nuclear weapons by European states affects the international non-proliferation regime. 
Yet, US President Obama’s vocal commitment to global nuclear disarmament might soon oblige the two 
European nuclear powers to discuss publicly the long-term future of their nuclear arsenals.2  
At present, nuclear weapons remain the core of the defence postures of France and the UK. French 
proposals to gradually integrate both French and British nuclear forces into a joint European arsenal 
were tabled in the early nineties but were soon discarded in the face of opposition from European part-
ners. Such proposals have been renewed by the French leadership, most recently by President Sarkozy, 
albeit with little repercussion. But fifteen years after the first debates on the European dissuasion concertée 
the issue warrants re-examination given the ongoing transformations in European security: The EU has 
acquired a military dimension by creating military structures in the Council and transferring the capa-
bilities from the WEU to the EU, thereby completing a transformation from a purely civilian entity to 
                                                        
1 The authors thank Nick Ritchie, Ulrich Franke, Stephanie Anderson, Natividad Fernandez and two anonymous 
reviewers for valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper.   
2 Obama, 2009 (a), (b) 
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an organisation with a manifest military and security dimension. Hence, in view of the growing pro-
gress in the integration of defence policies among EU member states, the question of the “European 
option” is likely to be re-opened in the near future.3 .  
The present article seeks to address the antinomy between the increasing progress in the framing of a 
European foreign and defence policy, particularly through the development of non-proliferation poli-
cies, with the continuance of (strictly national) nuclear deterrence in Europe. What is the purpose of 
European nuclear forces? Could a “European nuclear deterrent” be envisaged as the future stage in the 
ongoing framing of a European defence policy? And what would this imply for global nuclear disarma-
ment? The article first reviews and compares the core features of French and British nuclear strategies. 
A second section looks at the current stage of development of the CFSP, analysing its degree of maturity 
in the framing of a common defence. A third part revises the arguments for and against a nuclear de-
terrent advanced in the 1990s, while the fourth section tests their soundness in the current strategic 
context. We conclude by presenting some reflections on the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe.  
 
       
I. The European Nuclear Powers: France and the UK 
During the Cold War, the nuclear landscape in Western Europe presented a mosaic featuring diverging 
attitudes towards the notion of nuclear deterrence. The only two nuclear powers on the continent de-
fined different roles for their “ultimate” weapons. British nuclear forces were fully integrated into the 
nuclear planning and defence strategy of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). By contrast, 
following France’s decision to leave the integrated military structure in 1966, its nuclear arsenal re-
mained separate from any international framework. Justified as a safeguard of French strategic inde-
pendence, its nuclear deterrent officially fulfilled a purely national role. As for the non-nuclear powers, 
two main attitudes towards the notion of nuclear deterrence co-existed on the continent. With the only 
exception of Ireland, the member states of the then European Community (EC) were simultaneously 
members of NATO, and were thus covered by the US nuclear umbrella (Becker, 2003). Some NATO 
members like Germany or Belgium, despite being non-nuclear weapons states, hosted US nuclear weap-
ons in their territory. Neutral states remained both outside NATO and the EC. In this heterogeneous 
landscape, those who were protected by collective defence commitment of the Atlantic Alliance ac-
cepted the logic of nuclear deterrence, while neutral countries such as Sweden and Ireland openly op-
posed it.  
Today, two of the currently 27 member states of the European Union maintain an arsenal of nuclear 
weapons: France and the United Kingdom. According to estimations, France possesses 348 deployed 
                                                        
3 During the revision of the EES in 2008, the question of how the EU should “deal with the military nuclear di-
mension” was raised (Silvestri, 2008:11). 
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warheads; the UK is said to maintain a stockpile of approximately 160 nuclear weapons (Kile, Fed-
chenko and Kristensen, 2007: 515). Thus, the EU represents the global nuclear order of haves (nuclear 
weapons states, NWS) and have-nots (non-nuclear weapons states, NNWS) on a miniature scale (Grand, 
2000:47). While France and the UK are not willed to abandon their nuclear capacities, disarmament 
supporters such as Sweden vehemently demand significant reductions.  
 
France 
France's force de frappe dates back to the early 1950s, when the French parliament agreed upon a five-
year-programme to establish a nuclear complex. The French decision to go nuclear exemplifies a mix-
ture of motives: Considerations of power and self-defence were responsible for the establishment of a 
French nuclear capability. In this reading, nuclear weapons function as a measure to defend the state 
against foreign aggression without being dependent on allies. This rationale was mirrored in France’s 
nuclear doctrine, which justifies the possession of atomic weapons as a means of "deterrence of the 
strong by the weak" (dissuasion du faible au fort). Mainly targeted at the Soviet Union, it was based on 
France´s capacity to inflict unacceptable damage on a militarily superior enemy.4 In addition, there is 
also a symbolic edge to the acquisition of atomic weapons: considered a symbol of modernity, strength 
and national greatness, nuclear weapons epitomized a healing remedy to make up for the trauma and 
humiliation experienced in World War II – which was even more desired as the country's status as 
colonial power vanished in the 1960s.5 De Gaulle's exclamation "France cannot be France without great-
ness"6 captures this aspiration for national status, rhetorically justifying the acquisition of nuclear weap-
ons as an embodiment of grandeur and prestige. Referring to these ideational considerations, Scott D. 
Sagan later coined the expression of "nuclear symbolism" (Sagan, 1997). The doctrinal idea of tous azi-
muts ('targeted in all directions'), entailing that France should be able to carry out a nuclear strike against 
any target in the world, perpetuates a great-power self-perception.  
The end of the Cold War, however, brought about profound changes to the French nuclear forces, par-
ticularly in the force structure: with the elimination of ground-based missile systems, France now relies 
on only two delivery systems: a fleet of four submarines plus 84 aircrafts (60 land-based Mirages and 
24 carrier-based Super Étendard). Yet, more revealing than the numerical reductions are doctrinal ad-
justments. In a speech given in January 2006 then-President Jacques Chirac departed from the tradi-
tional deterrence role of French nukes. Whereas in former years a nuclear strike was only conceived in 
                                                        
4 Hymans claims that the French nuclear weapons programme was firstly directed against Germany: "[W]henever 
de Gaulle, as president of the Fifth Republic, would come to the CEA [Commissariat à l'énergie atomique] he would 
ask 'each time the same question: he wanted to know when, how, how fast and in how much time the Germans 
could in turn build themselves the bomb, if (…) they decided to make it". (Hymans, 2006: 113) 
5 The question of pride gains even greater significance if one keeps in mind that France has developed its nuclear 
capability in the absence of foreign aid - unlike e.g. the UK which benefitted from US aid. 
6 quoted in (Markey, 2000: 96) 
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case of a threat to France’s "vital interests", the threshold was now critically lowered: Nuclear weapons 
came to be seen as a means for “safeguarding our strategic supplies”. According to Chirac, France 
should develop a nuclear posture that contemplated their use in contingencies with smaller powers or 
terrorist groups and in less than existential situations (Chirac 2006). In an interview (from which he later 
retracted himself), he envisioned the use of nuclear weapons against states intent on acquiring nuclear 
capabilities. 7 
   
As the current President, Nicolas Sarkozy, has not yet issued a full doctrinal analysis on the future of 
the French nuclear forces, prospects are difficult to foresee. So far, signals are mixed: while pointing to 
NPT-obligations, force reductions, and nuclear disarmament, Sarkozy also highlights the fundamental 
role of nuclear weapons in French security. On the occasion of the launch of a new nuclear submarine, 
he declared: 
"Our nuclear deterrence protects us from any aggression against our vital interests emanating 
from a state – wherever it may come from and whatever form it may take. Our vital interests, of 
course, include the elements that constitute our identity and our existence as a nation-State, as 
well as the free exercise of our sovereignty. (…) All those who would threaten our vital interests 
would expose themselves to severe retaliation by France resulting in damages unacceptable to 
them, out of proportion with their objectives. Their centres of political, economic and military 
power would be targeted on a priority basis." (Sarkozy, 2008) 
It remains to be seen if Sarkozy departs from the route taken by his predecessor. Yet there is little evi-
dence of a far-reaching renunciation of the guidelines developed under Chirac. Instead, we seem to be 
witnessing the continued appreciation of nuclear weapons within the French military doctrine (Tertrais, 
2008). The 2008 White Paper on Defence points into that direction: 
"Nuclear deterrence remains an essential concept of national security. (…) Given the diversity of 
situations to which France might be confronted in an age of globalisation, the credibility of the 
deterrent is based on the ability to provide the President with an autonomous and sufficiently 
wide and diversified range of assets and options."(French White Paper, 2008: 2) 
Emphasizing nuclear weapons' utility in a "diversity of situations", not least as a protection against 
threats to "our identity", serves as a justification for their persistence. Within the French society and the 
political elite there is a virtual lack of contestation of nuclear weapons. Instead, a vivid nuclear consen-
sus prevails that is tightly linked to a conception of France's role in the world and which dates back to 
De Gaulle. He laid the grounds for the so-called "monarchie nucléaire": the incommensurable shaping 
power of the French president in nuclear issues (Wisotzki, 2005).  
                                                        
7Sciolino, E. and Bennhold, K., 2007. “Chirac strays from assailing a nuclear Iran”, New York Times, 1st Febru-
ary 2007, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/01/world/europe/01france.html?fta=y) 
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Hence, the French nuclear discourse developed in a rather streamlined and, as Larsen has carved out, 
almost "mythical" (Larsen, 1996: 120) fashion. This is reflected in two key concepts: L'arme de la paix and 
Dissuasion du faible au fort. The l'arme de la paix (weapon of peace) understanding severely downplays the 
devastating effects of nuclear weapons by euphemistically suggesting that they bring about a beneficial 
result: peace. Dissuasion du faible au fort (deterrence of the strong by the weak) purports an exclusively 
defensive character of the nuclear forces. The metaphor of the "small" suggests that vulnerable France 
has only one measure to defend itself against the Soviet threat. The possession of nuclear weapons has 
thus long been legitimised as a means of last resort against the superior enemy - an image that persists, 
although the scenario of nuclear weapons' use has changed significantly. This predominant view on the 
assumed legitimacy and necessity of atomic weapons has long prevented the rise of any nuclear critical 
voices. Unsurprisingly, France's 2006 nuclear doctrine hardly attracted attention, let alone fundamental 
criticism.  
A close look at the case of the UK shows, however, that France's stance toward nuclear (non-) disarma-
ment is far from unique: both European nuclear states share many commonalities in their nuclear poli-
cies.  
 
United Kingdom 
The UK nuclear programme dates back to the early post-World War II years. In 1947 the administration 
of Prime Minister Clement Attlee secretly started an autonomous British weapons programme (Milne, 
2003; Baylis, 2001). In contrast to the French forces, the British nuclear weapons became fully integrated 
into NATO. In terms of Cold War strategic thinking its function was to complicate any war initiation 
for the Soviet leadership by constituting both a “second centre of decision-making” in the West as well 
as an add-on to the US capabilities (Quinlan, 2004). Today, the UK maintains a fleet of four nuclear-
powered submarines equipped with 12-14 Trident missiles; almost 200 nuclear warheads, thereof 160 
operational, complete the arsenal. This approximates a reduction of about 30 percent compared to Cold 
War sizes (Norris and Kristensen, 2002: 103-104). Furthermore, the only one submarine that is nowadays 
on patrol is "maintained at a level of reduced readiness with a 'notice to fire' measured in days, and its 
missiles are de-targeted" (Kile and Kristensen, 2005: 589).8  
  
Yet, the British government’s strategy remains ambivalent: while it reiterates its commitment to the NPT 
and eventual nuclear disarmament, it is still attached to the idea of maintaining a ‘minimum’ nuclear 
                                                        
8 The gentle adjustments made since the end of the Cold War are partly due to the strong anti-nuclear movement 
in the UK. The administration’s recent decision to modernize the nuclear arsenal was accompanied by large scale 
protests and a fierce parliamentary debate (cf. Johnson, 2007) 
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deterrence. One year after coming to power the Labour government announced reductions in the nu-
clear forces, and at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the British delegation helped to achieve a minimal 
consensus. Overall, it failed to follow up on these first steps. And the ambiguity persists: While the 
Brown administration – in accordance with his forerunner Tony Blair – presses ahead with the modern-
ization of the Trident nuclear weapons system9, several high-ranking government officials, such as then-
Foreign Secretary Margaret Beckett (Beckett, 2007) and her successor David Miliband10 or former De-
fence Secretary Des Browne (Browne, 2008), expressed their sympathy for nuclear disarmament.11 Sim-
ilarly, while Prime Minister Gordon Brown claimed that in 2010 the UK will be “at the forefront of the 
international campaign to accelerate disarmament amongst possessor states” (Brown, 2008), he also in-
sisted that keeping a nuclear force was “non-negotiable”.12 This attitude is backed by the government’s 
assertion that the "Cold War threat has been replaced by a diverse but interconnected set of threats and 
risks, which affect the United Kingdom directly and also have the potential to undermine international 
stability”(National Security Strategy, 2008: 3). Consequently, defence could only be guaranteed through 
an independent nuclear deterrent as “fundamental principles relevant to nuclear deterrence have not 
changed since the end of the Cold War, and are unlikely to change in future”(The Future of the United 
Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, 2006). The maintenance of nuclear weapons is not only framed as neces-
sary to preserve international stability, but implicitly also as a service to the international community. 
This rhetorical move removes the nuclear weapons issue from a purely national agenda, relating it in-
stead to the need for international stability: the continued reliance on nuclear weapons by a “reliable” 
and “responsible” great power is necessary to uphold international peace and stability. It is this self-
conception of being a responsible and rational, while globally potent great power that presents the ma-
jor obstacle to abandoning UK´s nuclear weapons.13      
Such a strategic conception has grave implications for both international security and common Euro-
pean defence.14 The assurance to use these “weapons of last resort” only for defensive purposes is mis-
leading, as Rogers points out: 
"The problem with this is that it is one of the great myths of the nuclear age. (…) Nato as an 
alliance, and Britain as a state, have long planned to fight nuclear wars at levels falling far short 
of a cataclysmic central nuclear exchange. This also means that Nato and Britain have had, and 
still maintain, policies that can envisage ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons." (Rogers, 2006) 
                                                        
9 In March 2007, the UK Government voted for the replacement of current Trident systems and for retaining UK´s 
nuclear weapons posture (Johnson, 2007)  
10 On 4 February 2009, Miliband presented a report entitled ‚Lifting the Nuclear Shadow: Creating the Conditions 
for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons‘. 
11 The British public is increasingly opposed to the modernization of nuclear forces (Stratton, 2009. ‘Two thirds of 
voters oppose replacement of Trident, poll shows’, The Guardian, 21 September). 
12 quoted in BBC News (London), 2009. ‘Brown move to cut UK nuclear subs’, 23 September  
13 Ritchie, 2009  
14 The usefulness of nuclear weapons in the contemporary security environment has been challenged (Ritchie, 2008) 
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Furthermore, the recurrent reference to the UK´s disarmament record is deceptive. While the UK is 
arguably the most “arms control-friendly” of the nuclear weapon states, the British government has 
announced the modernisation of its arsenals and also developed new options of use for what is called 
"sub-strategic" weapons, i.e. weapons with a low-yield that might be used as a final warning or to "de-
capitate" a rogue state's leadership (The Future of the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent, 2006: 23). 
These sub-strategic weapons lower the threshold of nuclear use, blurring the distinction between con-
ventional and atomic weapons.15 In sum, all three aspects – the modernisation of weapon systems, the 
refusal to implement a no-first-use policy as well as the development of more “usable” nuclear weapons 
– have rendered the use of such weapons more likely than during Cold War times. Moreover, the “de-
terrence” trope and the related link to the reputed Cold War stability blights a more thorough debate 
about the effectiveness of deterrence under the conditions of the post-Cold War era. Instead, it suggests 
that there are indeed what Lebow calls easy “technical fixes” (Lebow, 2005: 772) to problems which 
might in fact be very political in nature and purports that the roles of “defender” and “challenger” in a 
conflict are always evident and clear-cut.  
 
Growing Convergence  
Despite the different origins and rationales of the French and British deterrents, the past two decades 
have witnessed an increasing convergence in the formulation of their nuclear doctrines. This is part of 
a growing approximation of the defence policies of these two countries in the aftermath of the Cold 
War: The traditionally Atlanticist Britain has come to accommodate a defence role for the EU, while 
exceptionalist France has gradually reintegrated into Atlantic structures (Matlary, 2008). Franco-British 
approximation in the field of nuclear doctrine presumably owes much to the establishment of regular 
bilateral talks on military nuclear issues in the early nineties (Croft, 1996: 777-780).16 Joint statements 
underlined a “considerable convergence…on nuclear doctrine and policy” already in 1995: “We do not 
see situations arising in which the vital interest of either France or the United Kingdom could be threat-
ened without the vital interests of the other also being threatened”.17 
Public discourses on nuclear proliferation in the two countries have converged, becoming increasingly 
dominated by the theme of how the “custodians of law” are responsible not only for their own protec-
tion, but also for preventing countries such as North Korea or Iran or non-state actors from realising 
                                                        
15 This “conventionalization” of nuclear weapons arguably undermines the nuclear taboo (cf. Tannenwald, 
2007:383-387)  
16 Cooperation is presumed to embrace the coordination of submarine patrols. (Kile, Fedchenko and Kristensen, 
2006: 653) 
17 British-French Joint Statement on Nuclear Co-operation, 30 October 1995 
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their aspirations for nuclear programmes. Underlying these postures are linguistic frames and meta-
phors of (in-) security which portray the "world out there" as an inherent danger to "benevolent" Europe, 
hence legitimising the given nuclear order of haves and have-nots. As Gusterson argues: 
"The discourse on nuclear proliferation legitimates this system of domination while presenting 
the interests the established nuclear powers have in maintaining their nuclear monopoly as if 
they were equally beneficial to all nations of the globe. And, ironically, the discourse on non-
proliferation presents the subordinate nations as the principal source of danger in the world." 
(Gusterson, 1999: 132) 
By framing the current nuclear order as a dichotomy of (i) the passively deterring “benign” and “ra-
tional” Self against (ii) the “evil” and “passionate” Other, the very order is constructed, naturalized and 
legitimated. This prevailing frame is used as a justification for a continued policy of nuclear deterrence 
and of non-proliferation directed at potential nuclear enemies while ignoring problems arising from the 
European nuclear status. Some references to the desirability of complete nuclear disarmament notwith-
standing, nuclear weapons will therefore remain the cornerstone of British and French military postures 
for the foreseeable future. But how is this approach to global security reconciled with the security vision 
upheld by the EU and by its member states? What does this imply for the further process of European 
integration and the long-term goal of a common European defence? In the following section, we revise 
the current state of the CFSP and attempt to ascertain its degree of “maturity” to host a common Euro-
pean deterrent.      
  
The emerging European level  
Over fifty years of European integration have led to an unprecedented depth of cooperation not only in 
"soft" policy areas, but even in security policy – a core element of the traditional notion sovereignty. The 
Lisbon Treaty, the most recent revision of the Treaty of European Union (TEU) currently in the process 
of ratification, contains a number of provisions bound to strengthen collaboration in security and mili-
tary affairs. Notably, it foresees the creation of a common European diplomatic service and the exten-
sion of "enhanced cooperation" to “permanent structured cooperation”, permitting groups of states to 
proceed to new levels of interstate military teamwork. The Treaty enshrines a mutual defence commit-
ment and mentions the European Armaments Agency, which had been in existence since 2003 but has 
not yet found reflection in the Treaty (TEU Art. 42). With the eventual ratification of the Lisbon text, 
these changes will pave the way to an increasingly integrated security policy, as heralded in the Treaty:  
"The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas 
of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive fram-
ing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence." (TEU Art. 24.1) 
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Most centrally, the Treaty foresees the possibility of creating of a common defence through a unanimous 
decision by the Council, making a new treaty revision unnecessary:  
"The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common 
Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting 
unanimously, so decides." (TEU Art. 42.2)   
 
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation 
A similar trend of enhanced cooperation can be observed in the realm of arms control and non-prolif-
eration. Since the release of its first Strategy against the Proliferation of WMD in 2003, the EU has 
evolved into an active proponent of initiatives in this area (Portela, 2003). The Strategy was intended to 
mark a fresh start in the aftermath of the pronounced disagreements over the US intervention in Iraq 
and to heal not only the transatlantic, but even more so the inner-European rift that had been exposed 
(Everts and Keohane, 2003: 167).18 Consequently, as EU foreign policy appeared in shambles after the 
Iraq crisis, the development of a comprehensive European approach to non-proliferation offered an 
opportunity to reunite the continent under a common goal. As Menon argues, the dispute over Iraq 
might even have been "salutary" for the future of ESDP (Menon, 2004: 631), providing a stimulus which 
culminated in the adoption of the European Security Strategy and the Strategy against the Proliferation 
of WMD.19 Under the heading of "effective multilateralism" the EU pledges to strengthen multilateral 
arms control regimes and to enforce WMD non-proliferation by civilian and if necessary also by military 
means. 20 
Most EU non-proliferation activities are canalised through international organisations, primarily the 
International Atomic Agency (IAEA) and the Organisation for the entry into force of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO), which receive funds to support specific programmes such as the strengthen-
ing of export controls in third countries as part of the  threat reduction initiatives within the framework 
of the G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons21. Moreover, the EU undertakes 
diplomatic demarches to multilateralise and strengthen the implementation of international regimes: 
After 2003, the EU has devoted its efforts to the promotion of the signing and entry into force of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Union has also incorporated proliferation concerns in bi-
lateral relations with third countries through the inclusion of a “Non-Proliferation Clause” whereby 
                                                        
18 A climax was reached in January 2003, when five EU members and three acceding countries issued the so-called 
"Letter of Eight", where they outspokenly aligned themselves with US plans to attack Iraq in open opposition to the 
French and German rejection of the war. Wall Street Journal 2003 
19 European Security Strategy "A Secure Europe in a Better World", December 2003, URL: http://www.consilium.eu-
ropa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf; "Strategy Against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction", De-
cember 2003, URL: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/st15708.en03.pdf;"  
20 The 2005 NPT Review Conference supports this mixed judgment. Whereas the Conference as such failed, Europe's 
performance as broker between several blocs was promising. (Müller, 2005) 
21 See: http://www.g8.gc.ca/2002Kananaskis/kananaskis/globpart-en.asp 
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both the EU and its partner commit to non-proliferation goals. Additionally, co-operation with the US 
in non-proliferation matters has flourished: The EU has embraced the US-launched Proliferation Secu-
rity Initiative (PSI) geared towards the interception of illegal shipments of sensitive materials and, most 
visibly, it has upgraded its role in the management of proliferation crises. Whereas EU involvement in 
the resolution of the nuclear questions in North Korea and elsewhere were limited to the provision of 
financial support, the diligent role played by the UK, France and Germany in the Iranian nuclear crisis 
since revelations about uranium enrichment evidence a change in attitude (Denza, 2004; Sauer, 2004). 
As suggested by Perthes, the EU had "for once adopted a proactive approach, rather than limiting itself 
to supporting or criticizing American politics" (Perthes, 2005: 17).  
However, given that EU non-proliferation policy is based on the “lowest common denominator” among 
states with diverging attitudes towards nuclear weapons, it sidelines nuclear disarmament: While the 
text of the NPT recognises the link between disarmament and non-proliferation, the EU has hardly ad-
dressed “its own” disarmament in its declarations and action plans – even though pro-disarmament 
states such as Ireland and Sweden continuously lobby for the goals of the New Agenda Coalition 
(NAC).22 Hence, EU discourse reveals a dramatic misfit: When Europe talks about arms control and 
non-proliferation it is rarely concerned with its member states, but with the enforcement of disarma-
ment among "the others".  
In EU rhetoric, the omission of disarmament questions is made possible through several means. Firstly, 
the Union ascribes itself a distinctive role in the field: “The EU wants to act before the threat materialises, 
we want to ‘prevent’” (Gianella, 2008a: 4). Secondly, the EU looks upon non-proliferation as a domain 
where it can demonstrate its capacity for internal coordination and external visibility, circumventing 
the question of the efficacy of its policies by remaining “self-centred”: “within the UN system, the EU 
is now identified as the major sponsor of the multilateral treaty system” (Gianella, 2008a: 6); the fact 
that the High Representative Solana has received a mandate by the US, Russia and China in the negoti-
ation with Iran is “a recognition of the EU’s growing role on the international scene”(Gianella, 2008b: 
7), and the Lisbon Treaty provides him “with the instruments to ensure a stronger coordination between 
first and second pillar activities” (Gianella, 2008a: 11). These references suggest that EU action is not 
primarily evaluated in terms of the contribution it makes to advance non-proliferation and disarmament 
goals – it functions as a vehicle for self-representation and increased European unity.  
Some acknowledgement of the tensions that mark the NPT regime is also present in EU discourse: 
“There are persisting problems in the non-proliferation system that can undermine its well-functioning 
                                                        
22 The Swedish commitment to nuclear disarmament became most visible in its establishing of the "Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Commission" (WMDC) to explore the prospects of WMD disarmament in 2003. Also indicative 
of the Swedish and Irish position is the Working Paper submitted by the New Agenda Coalition to the 2005 NPT 
Review Conference, which calls upon all NPT state parties “to accelerate the implementation of the practical steps 
for systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament."  
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if not its sheer existence”, the EU Representative on non-proliferation of WMD admitted (Gianella, 2007: 
6). However, the problem is presented as a question of misperceptions: “dissatisfaction with the dis-
armament process leads [NNWS] to believe that non-proliferation is simply a concern of nuclear weap-
ons states, or more widely of developed countries, and that they do not really need to care about the 
non proliferation regime” (Gianella, 2008a: 8). NNWS discontent with the regime is not viewed as re-
sulting from lack of implementation, but framed as “mistrust due to differing understandings and var-
ying perceptions of the obligations and benefits of the system” (Gianella, 2008b: 6). This evidences the 
complex and inconsistent nature of European approach. On the one hand, the European states have 
reached an undreamt level of integrative depth: common European practices already cut deep into the 
realm of defence. On the other hand, speaking of "one European actor" particularly in the field of de-
fence policy conceals the multitude of diverging and partially even contradicting positions among mem-
ber states.  
 
II. “Concerted Deterrence”: The 1990s Debate  
The idea of integrating the European nuclear forces surfaced shortly after the end of the Cold War. The 
geopolitical transformation provoked by the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact profoundly affected the 
nuclear setting of the continent, not least through the subsequent removal of most US nukes from their 
European storage sites. While no official numbers are available, NATO sources indicate that the Alliance 
“currently deploys a few hundred nuclear weapons in Europe”.23 NATO’s nuclear planning groups and 
consultations committees reduced their activities to a minimum and the European nuclear powers re-
duced their military nuclear capabilities.  Still, the disappearance of the Soviet threat left them in a sit-
uation where the maintenance of what was left of their arsenals became increasingly difficult to justify.     
As early as in 1992, France formulated the first proposal to move towards the integration of the Euro-
pean atomic arsenals.24 Whilst British nuclear forces were already internationalised in the framework of 
NATO, France’s attachment to the independent role of its nuclear deterrent had lost its rationale. The 
first sign was given by President Mitterrand in a colloquium on European integration, where he unex-
pectedly stated that “the issue of compatibility between the French nuclear forces and  European de-
fence would have to be addressed” at some point (quoted in Boniface, 1996:102). He also noted that the 
formulation of a common European nuclear doctrine would “quickly become one of the major questions 
in the construction of a common European defence” (quoted in Tertrais, 1999: 56). The fact that this 
initial indication fell short of a fully-fledged proposal suggests that the intention was merely to launch 
                                                        
23 NATO deputy assistant secretary-general for weapons of mass destruction policy and director for nuclear policy 
Mr Guy Roberts; (quoted in Meier, 2007:1) 
24 It should be noted that France had made previous attempts to internationalise the role of its atomic forces after 
it left NATO’s integrated structure (Schmidt, 2004) 
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a reflection on the subject (Boniface, 1996). Only a few weeks on, Deputy Defence Minister Mellick elab-
orated the initiative by presenting several options for its realisation, coining the term “dissuasion concer-
tée”, which translates as “concerted deterrence” (Schmitt, 1997).  
Subsequently, the idea was further elaborated by senior officials. However, after other EU member 
states rejected the proposal, the French leadership renounced the idea, noting that European deterrence 
could not come about “until vital interests fully converged” (quoted in Boniface, 1996:102).  In the after-
math of the French nuclear tests of 1995 Jacques Chirac and Alain Juppé re-launched the concept of a 
dissuasion concertée, sparkling a wider debate beyond France’s borders. However, the division between 
opponents and advocates of the concept ran along national lines. Amidst the international condemna-
tion provoked by the tests, the proposal was resolutely rejected by European neighbours, who perceived 
the French move as a manoeuvre geared at legitimising the nuclear tests (Schmitt, 1997).  
The precise configuration of a dissuasion concertée, meant to extend the French nuclear umbrella to the 
rest of the EU, was left vague by the various politicians who advanced it. This imprecision might have 
been intended to attract the interest of the addressees by allowing them to contribute to the shape of the 
actual arrangement. In any case, the indeterminate nature of the concept was criticised by observers as 
having contributed to its unpopularity (Boniface, 1996). According to the leadership, the concept of the 
dissuasion concertée is defined by the ultimate aim of extending the scope of the French deterrent to cover 
other member states. The 1994 French proposal was not meant to include necessarily the entire EU into 
the arrangement: “This is not about unilaterally extending our deterrence or imposing a new contract 
on our partners...We do not propose a ready-made concept, but a gradual process open to those partners 
who wish to join” (Chirac, 1996, emphasis added). The intention was to progressively include new mem-
bers into the bilateral consultations on nuclear questions already in place with the UK, the principal 
addressee being Germany. Prime Minister Juppé declared that concerted deterrence was based on “the 
necessity for dialogue between two equal partners, on a subject that concerns their common future. 
Germany has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons…that commitment makes it even more im-
portant for Germany’s security to be guaranteed against that threat”.25 The rationale for the establish-
ment of the dissuasion concertée was justified on a double footing: a “de-facto security interdependence” 
that binds EU members together, and the path of European integration, whose ultimate aim was pre-
sented as the creation of a “strategically autonomous” actor. From this perspective, the process of Eu-
ropean integration was portrayed as incomplete as long as it lacked a common nuclear deterrent. In this 
vein, Chirac claimed that “this is about drawing all the consequences from a community of destiny, of 
a growing and intertwining of our vital interests” (Chirac, 1996). This was to be accomplished through 
a process in which partners gradually join on an individual basis. The ultimate decision on use of atomic 
weapons was to remain in French hands – at least, no indications to the contrary were made (Müller, 
                                                        
25 quoted in: Butler et. al., 1997  
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1996). The presentation of the dissuasion concertée as a joint enterprise within the context of the EU with-
out requiring the participation of all members echoes the procedure known from the Schuman Declara-
tion: The then-French Foreign Minister proposed that Franco-German production of coal and steel be 
pooled “within the framework of an organisation open to the participation of the other countries of 
Europe” (Schuman, 1950). So while the seminal proposal for the creation of the European Coal and Steel 
Community originated as a Franco-German project, it marked the first step of European integration and 
eventually attracted membership of many more states.  
In view of the indeterminacy of the notion of dissuasion concertée, sympathising scholars fleshed it out 
by developing concrete options for implementation.26 One of the most elaborated proposals featured a 
progression starting with institutionalised consultations mechanisms on nuclear strategy and doctrine 
and eventually culminating in the creation of a “single European deterrent” (Tertrais, 1999). Scholars 
also formulated an “unofficial” catalogue of the conditions which European partners would need to 
embrace in order to participate in the arrangement: The point of departure consists in subscribing to the 
permanence of nuclear weapons “as a determining factor in strategy and international relations” for the 
foreseeable future, and accepting their continued relevance as a “last safeguard against the return to 
large conflicts in Europe”. The “maintenance of the political primate of nuclear powers” constituted 
another pre-condition (Bozo, 1996:99). From a military vantage point, it also entails the maintenance of 
“sufficient levels in both nuclear and conventional forces to deter potential aggressors” (Fricaud-
Chagnaud, 1996:90).  
For vocal proponents of nuclear disarmament like Sweden, Finland and Ireland the acceptance of the 
logic of nuclear deterrence was out of question. For NATO members, the most obvious obstacle to the 
adoption of the dissuasion concertée was the fear of weakening the transatlantic security link. While the 
UK was not fundamentally opposed to the French proposal, it made clear that it would only consider 
its implementation in a transatlantic context. The presence of a small number of atomic weapons in 
some European states under NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangement was perceived as having a strong 
symbolic value as an embodiment of the continued US commitment to European security and Alliance 
solidarity. France’s neighbours were fearful of undermining the transatlantic link through a de-facto 
replacement of the US nuclear guarantee by a French-led arrangement with which they feel ostensibly 
less at ease.  
A second difficulty relates to the implications for the proliferation regime. From a legal vantage point, 
it remains debatable whether the dissuasion concertée would be permissible.27 But beyond legal contro-
versies, a key concern here is that the creation of a common European deterrent covering a growing 
                                                        
26 Dumoulin 2004 
27 Germany foresaw the possibility already at the time the NPT was drafted, and acceded on condition that the 
treaty would not be interpreted “in such a way that it would hamper the further development of European inte-
gration, especially in the establishment of a European Union with its corresponding areas of competency” (Kuntzel, 
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number of states would severely undermine the spirit of the NPT (Butler et al., 1997; Müller, 1996).28 
Since the logic of nuclear deterrence is generally perceived as contradicting that of nuclear disarmament 
and non-proliferation, member states such as Germany fear that the Europeanisation of the French ar-
senal would be regarded as “internal proliferation” and undermine efforts to stem the spread of nuclear 
weapons at global level (Schmidt, 1994).29 “Internal proliferation” would have been especially difficult 
to justify in times where the possibility of a massive attack against Europe is minimal, and when nuclear 
weapons are experiencing a “crisis of legitimacy” (Schmitt, 1997:1).  
Finally, some questioned that the European project was sufficiently advanced to accommodate nuclear 
integration. The then-Spanish Foreign Minister Solana, who would later become NATO Secretary-Gen-
eral and subsequently High Representative for the CFSP, argued that dealing with nuclear issues at that 
stage was “like starting to build a house from the roof down” (quoted in Tertrais, 1999:60). In particular, 
intergovernmental co-operation in the CFSP was regarded as underdeveloped to allow for the inclusion 
of nuclear deterrence. As French analyst Bozo put it, “how can we entertain the ambition of a European 
deterrent after the Union has failed to bring peace to Bosnia?”(Bozo, 1996:96)30 Instead, he suggested 
starting by establishing a European consensus on proliferation and disarmament, given that these are 
“at the heart of the post-Cold War nuclear question” (Bozo, 1996: 99). To these concerns, one must add 
the reticence of small member states such as Denmark and Ireland to witness the creation of a Kerneuropa 
or noyau dur européen in the security field. Small and peripheral member states were suspicious that they 
might be confronted with the creation of a nuclear arrangement managed by a directoire of the three big 
member states operating at the margins of small members’ interest.   
Yet, what might have been misunderstood from the outset is the French motivation for tabling a pro-
posal of a dissuasion concertée. The ambition to increase international legitimation of the French atomic 
arsenal, virtually uncontested domestically, can only partially account for the proposal.  An equally 
powerful driving force presumably was the search for leadership in the construction of l’Europe de la 
défense, a motivation already present in the decision to withdraw from NATO’s integrated structures in 
the sixties.31 Thus, France’s proposal can be understood as an attempt to regain relevance in a field 
                                                        
1995:146). In contrast, the Anglo-American view is that the extension of the Franco-British nuclear umbrella to other 
countries would entail a breach of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, bar transfer of nuclear weapons or control over 
them to any recipient, including a multilateral entity, unless the nuclear-weapon states concerned ceased to exist 
(Butler et al, 1997).  
28 Butler et al. 1997; Müller 1996 
29 Schmidt 2004 
30 Bozo 1996 
31 Commenting that decision, Freedman acknowledges that according to de Gaulle’s plans “France was to be the 
focal point for the new Europe, but the problem of inconsistencies between the national interests of France and the 
more general interests of her neighbours was not followed up. The consequences of de Gaulle’s policy were the 
opposite to those intended”(Freedman, 2004: 307) 
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where it is willing to make a major contribution and at a stage of European integration where the grow-
ing number of member states threatens to diminish the leadership role that France had traditionally 
shared with Germany.  
      
III. A European Deterrent for the XXIst Century?   
Despite the failure of the idea of dissuasion concertée in its initial stage, French leaders reiterate their 
proposal several times (Schmidt, 2004). Most recently, President Sarkozy proposed “to engage those 
European partners who so wish in an open dialogue on the role of deterrence and its contribution to 
our common security" (Sarkozy, 2008). Sarkozy presents extended deterrence as a function the French 
nuclear arsenal is already fulfilling:  
“Our deterrence also takes into account changes in…our alliances and in European construc-
tion. […] As for Europe, it is a fact: by their very existence, French nuclear forces are a key 
element in Europe’s security. Any aggressor who might consider challenging it must be mindful 
of this.”   
This is followed by a direct linkage to European integration: “our commitment to the security of our 
European partners is the natural expression of our ever-closer union”. Thus, the current French proposal 
maintains the essential traits of its predecessors: it frames the idea as a further step in European inte-
gration, while presenting it as an offer to interested parties. Interestingly, Sarkozy's speech also inter-
weaves the "common European deterrence"-frame with references to Europe as a “community of val-
ues":  
"Never in history has our national security been so intimately tied to that of our allies and our 
European partners. Our common destiny lies with the European Union and beyond that, with 
all nations that share our values: peace, freedom, fraternity, the defence of the equal and irre-
ducible dignity of human beings regardless of colour, creed and origin."        
These two argumentative threads function as a twofold justification of French nuclear weapons: Not 
only is the continued reliance on nuclear weapons justified by the necessity for France to fulfil its duties 
as a EU-member and to protect both French territory as well as its European neighbours. It is addition-
ally justified on a moral basis through the depiction of Europe as a benign community of peace-loving 
democracies. By rendering French nuclear weapons an essential constituent of the defence posture of 
"civilian power Europe", Sarkozy grants these weapons additional moral justification and legitimacy as 
"weapons of the good".  
How do these arguments fare fifteen years after the first proposals were tabled? The following para-
graphs re-examine the pertinence and force of the arguments of the 1990s debate under the present 
circumstances.    
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Why the proposal is becoming increasingly practicable 
In several respects, considerable progress in the construction of a European security policy in the fifteen 
years that have elapsed since the original proposal has placed the EU in a better position to accommo-
date a concerted deterrence. Today, an appropriate institutional framework is in place, as the military 
dimension of the EU is now endowed with tailor made structures replicating those of NATO. The Po-
litical and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff are already commanding 
ESDP operations and a security strategy provides guidelines for its action. The permanent structured 
co-operation in the field of ESDP, while falling short of accommodating nuclear questions along the 
lines of the French proposal, could allow for optional arrangements involving only a group of states 
notwithstanding the rejection of the proposal by some member states. Technically speaking, it would 
suffice if non-participating member states consented to the creation of such arrangement.   
However, notwithstanding the progress made in developing the EU’s strategic role, there are also limits 
to the European consensus on military questions. European efforts to increase its own role in defence 
and security matters are still inextricably linked with a deep concern for the health of the transatlantic 
link. The very inception of the EU Strategy against the proliferation of WMD epitomized this concern: 
it was not only an attempt to re-unite the estranged European powers behind a common cause, but also 
to offer the American partner a new point of contact for future joint efforts.  
 But if Europeans run separate operations and arrange their own independent nuclear deterrent, what 
common project is left to the Alliance?  
Underlying the preoccupation for the solidity of the transatlantic link, there are also limits to how com-
fortable Europeans feel about EU-only defence arrangements. There is still resistance to full defence 
integration. Then-Prime Minister Rasmussen of Denmark, a member state with a notorious opt-out in 
ESDP, justified his support for the Iraq war by emphasising the centrality of the US to Danish security: 
“Who else could guarantee our security? Could France – could Germany?” (Copenhagen Post, 2003). In 
an only-European context, the fears of small countries to become subject to the dictates of powerful 
member states come to the fore, particularly given that the nuclear possessors are two of the larger 
member states. Thus, European leaders are increasingly unwilling to host US nukes in their territory 
are unlike to accept an EU-only replacement. To follow up on the metaphor formulated by Solana, while 
the foundations of the house are in place, a few stores would still have to be built before we get to the 
roof.  
 
Why the proposal is unadvisable 
Even if this reticence was to subside in the near future as European defence collaboration deepens, the 
creation of a dissuassion concertée arrangement would still be unadvisable. The main reason is that it 
contradicts the declared CFSP objective of “preserving the NPT by all means” (Michel, 2005). The NPT 
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is based on the very deal whereby NNWS forego atomic weapons in exchange for access to civil nuclear 
technology and the eventual nuclear disarmament of the NWS. In the face of NNWS’ longstanding de-
nunciation of lack of progress in the disarmament commitment, decisive steps towards the eradication 
of atomic arsenals are needed in order to restore confidence in the NPT regime. Adopting a dissuasion 
concertée arrangement would be detrimental to that goal. Instead of representing a step towards dis-
armament, the replacement of a US-dominated nuclear deterrent by a Franco-British equivalent would 
reinforce the growing perception among NNWS that NWS are unprepared to abide by their commit-
ments, further undermining the legitimacy of non-proliferation efforts. If countries which find them-
selves surrounded by allies and protected by the double security guarantee enshrined in the Washing-
ton and Brussels Treaties are unwilling to remove nuclear weapons, why should states surrounded by 
hostile neighbours refrain from acquiring them?  
This leads us to the second reason why a dissuasion concertée is unadvisable: Europe does not depend on 
nuclear weapons to meet its security needs. For all its shortcomings, the ESS unequivocally indentified 
five threats to the security of the EU: failed states, terrorism, proliferation of WMD, organised crime and 
regional conflicts outside the EU. None of these threats can be satisfactorily addressed with nuclear 
weapons.  The fact that European defence project started out with the ESDP reflects that it is in the 
operational field that the EU felt the need to acquire means to enhance its security. In other words: while 
Europe certainly benefits from a deepened cooperation in order to address today’s security threats, 
common nuclear weapons are irrelevant to counter any of these challenges. 
Finally, any arrangement contemplating nuclear deterrence forcibly has to take into account the possi-
bility of the ‘failure of deterrence’, i.e. it needs to foresee the possibility of the actual use of atomic weap-
ons. Already during the Cold War the Atlantic Alliance witnessed profound disagreements over key 
questions of nuclear strategy and over when and how the nuclear threshold could be trespassed. Such 
controversies were only overcome through the dominant and ultimately decisive position of the US 
(Freedman, 2003). Setting aside the fact that the modalities for decision-making have never been speci-
fied by proponents of the dissuasion concertée, a collective arrangement in Europe would face comparable 
disagreements, particularly since the current defence strategies of the UK and France foresee multiple 
employment options of atomic weapons, thus lowering the nuclear threshold. In the absence of a pre-
ponderant US leadership and a unifying Soviet enemy, it is difficult to believe that the diffused “current 
threats” will elicit sufficient agreement among Europeans to allow for joint nuclear decision-making.                 
 
Conclusions 
The EU faces a serious dilemma in its common foreign and security policy. In spite of closer co-operation 
between member states in this realm, no serious consideration has been given to the future role of Eu-
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ropean, i.e. British and French, nuclear weapons, in the light of progressing integration. The EU’s vig-
orous demand for compliance with arms control obligations in its relations with third states smacks of 
double standards: as long as the UK and France continue to develop new weapons and doctrines of use, 
Europe cannot lend much credence to its own policies of non-proliferation. French and British nuclear 
discourses reveal little prospect for progress in nuclear disarmament. Both countries discursively justify 
their continued reliance on atomic weapons by reference to their own 'benign' identity as opposed to 
the dangerous international environment and the indispensable deterrence of existential threats or the 
defence of vital interests. Particularly in France, nuclear weapons carry a symbolic meaning of great 
power status that exceeds the weapons' military utility. Such justifications further decrease the likeli-
hood of nuclear disarmament. 
The timid advances for EU-nuclear sharing repeatedly made by the French government in the last years 
in the form of a dissuasion concertée are gradually becoming somewhat more practicable in the current 
stage of European construction than in the early nineties; yet, such a development remains inadvisable. 
While the EU is coming closer to develop the legal-institutional capacities to establish a European nu-
clear force, this would put under serious strain the transatlantic link and undermine the spirit of the 
NPT. Its militarily-strategic usefulness would be not only questionable, but possibly counterproductive: 
Weakening the NPT could eventually bring about a deterioration of the security of the EU, an entity 
more preoccupied with guaranteeing inner-European cohesion than with advancing the arms control 
agenda. 
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